If Roe Falls: Whole Woman’s Health Act as a Necessary Stop-Gap on the Way to Full Protection of Bodily Autonomy in Virginia by Varchena, Galina
Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 8
1-4-2019
If Roe Falls: Whole Woman’s Health Act as a
Necessary Stop-Gap on the Way to Full Protection
of Bodily Autonomy in Virginia
Galina Varchena
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Galina Varchena, If Roe Falls: Whole Woman’s Health Act as a Necessary Stop-Gap on the Way to Full Protection of Bodily Autonomy in
Virginia, 22 Rich. Pub. Int. L. Rev. 117 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
Do Not Delete 12/27/18 3:46 PM 
 
117 
IF ROE FALLS: WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ACT AS A 
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Pro-Choice Virginia, an organization that has been both instrumental in 
lobbying for the Whole Woman’s Health Act and a policy leader in Virgin-
ia for abortion rights. 
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ABSTRACT 
In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified the scenarios in which an “undue 
burden” is imposed on a pregnant person seeking an abortion in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. As a result, the constitutionality of many of 
Virginia’s abortion regulations seems in doubt. These unconstitutional reg-
ulations include the TRAP regulation that limits the type of facilities that 
can provide abortions, and statutes relating to informed consent and man-
datory waiting periods. Thus, the outlook following the Court’s ruling in 
Whole Woman’s Health looked, if not bright, then at least hopeful for re-
productive rights. That changed, though, with the Court’s 2018 ruling in 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra and the retirement 
of Justice Anthony Kennedy. Both the Court’s seeming reversal of some of 
the progress made in Whole Woman’s Health in Becerra and Justice Ken-
nedy’s retirement have darkened the outlook for reproductive rights going 
forward. Therefore, it is now necessary more than ever for Virginia to pass 
the Whole Woman’s Health Act to protect Virginians access to affordable 
and safe abortion services. The Whole Woman’s Health Act, that has been 
twice proposed and twice dismissed with little debate, would strike the stat-
utes that Whole Woman’s Health suggested were unconstitutional from the 
Virginia Code. Thus, ensuring safe and equal access to abortion services 
for all those who are need of these critical health care services.  
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2018, the Special Session of the General Assembly was just com-
ing to an end, and the goal for this paper was to make a strong argument 
that the General Assembly should pass the Whole Woman’s Health Act in 
Virginia because the 2016 Supreme Court decision, Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt, made many of Virginia’s abortion restrictions plainly uncon-
stitutional.1 The future looked, if not bright, then at least hopeful for repro-
ductive rights.2  
                                                
1 See Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
2 See Laura Vozzella & Gregory S. Schneider, Virginia General Assembly Approves Medicaid Expan-
sion to 400,000 Low-Income Residents, WASH. POST (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-senate-approves-medicaid-expansion-
to-400000-low-income-residents/2018/05/30/5df5e304-640d-11e8-a768-
ed043e33f1dc_story.html?utm_term=.69aaf08351d5.  
2
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/8
Do Not Delete 12/27/18  3:46 PM 
2018] IF ROE FALLS 119 
Then came National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra  
(NIFLA v. Becerra) and the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy.3 
NIFLA v. Becerra, in dicta, reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s approval for 
persuasion-based regulations of abortion upheld in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,4 this time on First Amendment grounds, with little room for a bal-
ancing test or a fact-based inquiry.5 Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s retire-
ment and the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court 
put the decision in Whole Woman’s Health, if not the entirety of Roe v. 
Wade,6 in jeopardy.7 Meanwhile, in Virginia, the Board of Health moved to 
re-open the question of the Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers 
(TRAP) regulations by directing the Commissioner of Health to restart the 
review process and issue a new Notice of Intended Regulatory Action 
(NOIRA).8 Additionally, several independent abortion providers filed a 
comprehensive federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia challenging the very same statutes and regula-
tions that the Whole Women’s Health Act proposed to strip out of Virginia’s 
civil and criminal code.9 
In an ideal world, the constitutionality of a given statute would not de-
pend on the current composition of the Supreme Court.10 This has never re-
                                                
3 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see Michael D. Shear, Su-
preme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retire-supreme-court.html. 
4 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
5 See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72 (“[T]his Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a sepa-
rate category of speech,” so “[s]peech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘profession-
als.’”). 
6 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
7 David S. Cohen, Scenario 3: The Right’s Incremental Push to Make Abortion Illegal, With Ka-
vanaugh’s Help, REWIRE NEWS (July 23, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/07/23/right-push-
abortion-illegal- kavanaugh/; Dawn Laguens, Kavanaugh Will Not Uphold Roe, THE HILL (July 10, 
2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/396309-kavanaugh- will-not-uphold-roe; see also Carol 
Joffe, With the Appointment of Brett Kavanaugh, Roe v. Wade is Likely Dead, WASH. POST (July 10, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/10/with-the-appointment-
of-brett-kavanaugh-roe-v-wade-is-likely-dead/?utm_term=.9db7426566ad (explaining that “[m]uch of 
the debate over the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to succeed Anthony M. Kennedy on the Supreme 
Court will center on the fate of Roe v. Wade and the future of abortion rights in America.”).  
8 Meeting Minutes, Va. State Bd. of Health (June 7, 2018), 
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/content/uploads/sites/4/2018/06/Minutes-June-2018-draft.pdf. 
9 See Complaint at 1, Falls Church Med. Ctr. v. Oliver, No. 3:18-cv-428 (E.D. Va. 2018) [hereinafter 
Falls Church Complaint]; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of Va., Virginia Health Care Providers 
File New Lawsuit Challenging Longstanding Abortion Restrictions, ACLU VIRGINIA (June 22, 2018), 
https://acluva.org/en/press-releases/virginia-health-care-providers-file- new-lawsuit-challenging-
longstanding-abortion. 
10 This seems an impossibly idealistic standard, even looking at the different interpretations of the con-
stitutionality of abortion regulations adopted by Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy in Whole Woman’s 
Health and Stenberg v. Carhart, and Casey respectively. For example, “[i]n Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized a wide range of permissible state interests implicated by abortion,” putting prefer-
ence on deference to state interests, “[w]here [the State] has a rational basis to act, and it does not im-
3
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ally been true, as the ideology of the Court has swung back and forth 
throughout the decades.11 But never before has the decision about the nomi-
nation of an associate justice to the Supreme Court been so blatantly based 
on a single litmus test as to make it improbable that the confirmation of 
Judge Kavanaugh will have no impact on the future of Roe. 12 After all, 
President Trump promised his constituents that he would appoint pro-life 
judges to the Supreme Court to overturn Roe.13  
Even if Roe is not overturned outright and the shell of the right to abor-
tion remains intact, it is highly likely that the constitutional right to a safe 
and legal abortion will continue to erode and the gains made in Whole 
Woman’s Health will be swiftly reversed as new abortion cases reach the 
Supreme Court.14 The fundamental promise of Roe, that the pre-viability 
right to an abortion would be protected as a fundamental right wherein any 
government interference with the right would be required to satisfy a “strict 
                                                                                                             
pose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power” to impose regulations “in furtherance of 
its legitimate interests.” Laura Wolk & O. Carter Snead, Irreconcilable Differences? Whole Woman’s 
Health, Gonzales, and Justice Kennedy’s Vision of American Abortion Jurisprudence, 41 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 719, 719 (2018) (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).). While in Whole 
Woman’s Health, Justice Breyer wrote that “Casey requires courts to ‘consider the burdens a law impos-
es on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer’ on pregnant women.” Id. at 719–20 
(quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).). This decision harkens 
back to “the approach he took in authoring Stenberg v. Carhart, another of the Supreme Court’s seminal 
abortion decisions.” Id. at 720 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)). The complaint of judi-
cial inconsistency goes both ways, with pro- and anti-abortion advocates noting the fluctuations in the 
application of the standards of review. See Kevin C. Walsh, Symposium: The Constitutional Law of 
Abortion after Whole Woman’s Health – What Comes Next?, SCOTUS BLOG (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium- the-constitutional-law-of-abortion-after-whole-
womans-health-what-comes-next/.  
11 See Alvin Chang, The Volatility of the Supreme Court, Explained in a Cartoon, VOX (July 2, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/7/2/17518822/supreme-court-kennedy-median-justice-volatile-cartoon.  
12 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, A Kavanaugh Signal on Abortion?, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/opinion/abortion-kavanaugh-trump- supreme-court.html; Aaron 
Blake, Trump Makes Clear Roe v. Wade is on the Chopping Block, WASH. POST (July 1, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/02/trump-makes-clear-roe-v-wade-is-on-the-
chopping- block/?utm_term=.d781aac837bb; Barbara Sprunt, Trump Downplays Roe v. Wade Litmus 
Test as He Considers a Supreme Court Nominee, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 1, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/01/625100343/trump-downplays-roe- v-wade-litmus-test-as-he-considers-
a-supreme-court-nominee. 
13 See Dan Mangan, Trump: I’ll Appoint Supreme Court Justices to Overturn Roe v. Wade Abortion 
Case, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/19/trump-ill-appoint-supreme-court-
justices-to-overturn-roe-v-wade- abortion-case.html. 
14 Even if Roe is overturned, abortion would not become illegal overnight and the determination of le-
gality of abortion would return to the states. Dan Horn, Ending Roe v. Wade Wouldn’t End Abortion in 
America. This is What Happens Next., THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2018/07/09/roe-v-wade-what-happens-if-supreme-court-
scotus-overturns-abortion-precedent/759500002/; Scott Lemieux, Commentary: How SCOTUS Can Stop 
Abortions Without Overruling Roe, REUTERS (July 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
lemieux-scotus-commentary/commentary-how-scotus-can-stop-abortions-without-overruling-roe-
idUSKBN1K025M (explaining that “Chief Justice John Roberts’ court is unlikely to overturn the Roe v. 
Wade ruling before the 2020 elections.”).  
4
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scrutiny” test, has been watered down significantly, perhaps most notably 
by Justice Kennedy in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey compromise.15 The 
promise of Roe has never really been fulfilled for a large number of women 
due to income and geographic constraints and constant attacks at both the 
federal and state levels. In many cases, the promise of Roe has been illusory 
rather than real.16 Roe was a “promise of greater reproductive freedom and 
an end to the fear and secrecy that had plagued many people’s experiences 
of ending pregnancies,” and a statement that a person’s interests in their 
own bodily autonomy superseded those of the state, at least pre-viability.17  
However, much like the provider-plaintiffs in the Falls Church Medical 
Center v. Oliver18  (Falls Church v. Oliver) lawsuit against the Common-
wealth of Virginia, I am unwilling to concede the fundamental point that 
many of the statutes and regulations constraining abortion providers cur-
rently in place in Virginia are consistent with the United States Constitu-
tion.19 Until Whole Woman’s Health is actually overturned it remains good 
law, thus the General Assembly should act accordingly.  
Abortion restrictions within the Virginia Code, even those previously 
upheld under Casey, are unlikely to withstand the undue burden test out-
lined in Whole Woman’s Health.20 The principle of stare decisis dictates 
that the Supreme Court, regardless of its constituent justices, should contin-
ue to uphold Whole Woman’s Health and protect the right to a safe and le-
gal abortion in the United States.21 While it is uncertain whether the Court 
                                                
15 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Barry P. McDonald, A Hellerstedt Tale: There and Back 
Again?, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 988–89 (2018). 
16 See Emily R. Champlin, Comment, The Myth of the “Welfare Queen”: Reproductive Oppression in 
the Welfare System, GOLDEN GATE U. SCH. OF L. POVERTY L. CONF. 1, 8–12 (2016), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/povlaw/6/.  
17 FARAH DIAZ-TELLO, MELISSA MIKESELL & JILL E. ADAMS, SIA LEGAL TEAM, ROE’S UNFINISHED 
PROMISE: DECRIMINALIZING ABORTION ONCE AND FOR ALL 1 (2018); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
163–64 (1973).  
18 Falls Church Med. Ctr. v. Oliver, No. 3:18-cv-00428 (E.D. Va. filed June 20, 2018). 
19 See Laura Vozzella, Abortion Rights Groups Sue Virginia Over Restrictions They Call Medically Un-
necessary, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
politics/abortion-rights-groups-sue-virginia-over-restrictions-they-call-medically-
unnecessary/2018/06/20/c2dd48d8-7499-11e8-b4b7-
308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.2cd259f75fea (noting that restrictions “that do not advance health 
and safety constitute ‘undue burden’”).  
20 See Mark R. Herring, Va. Attorney Gen., Statement of Attorney General Mark R. Herring On Su-
preme Court Ruling in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, OFF. ATTORNEY GEN. (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.oag.state.va.us/media-center/news-releases/772-june-27-2016-on-supreme-court-ruling-in-
whole-woman-s-health-v-hellerstedt.  
21 Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016) (defined as “The doctrine of prece-
dent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in liti-
gation.”); Dawn Johnsen, Entry 14: The Only Good Ruling Would Strike Down Texas’ Terrible Laws, 
SLATE (June 26, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2016/supreme_court_brea
5
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will in fact do so, Virginia should follow the example of states like Califor-
nia,22 Montana,23 and others, and seek to protect the residents of the Com-
monwealth from unnecessary encroachments on women’s access to neces-
sary reproductive healthcare.  
While amending the current TRAP regulations through the proposed 
NOIRA process can provide some relief, it would not be enough to undo all 
of the unconstitutional and medically unnecessary constraints on abortion.24 
And, because of the peculiarities of Virginia’s constitutional amendment 
process, achieving protection for abortion access through that avenue is a 
long, multi-year prospect.25 Passing the Whole Woman’s Health Act (the 
Act) would undo most of the worst abortion-related laws and regulations in 
Virginia with one stroke, ensuring that Virginia’s laws are both constitu-
tionally sound and consistent with good public health policy.26 The Act 
would bring abortion in line with other medical procedures, such as colon-
oscopies, root-canals, and miscarriages.27 The question that Whole Woman’s 
Health seems to implicitly posit is this – if treating abortion differently 
(which never means less stringently) than other healthcare procedures will 
                                                                                                             
kfast_table_for_june_2016/precedent_requires_the_supreme_court_to_save_abortion.html (implying 
that political party appointment may play a role in whether justices fairly apply precedential tests to fu-
ture cases).  
22 The California Constitution’s enumerated right to privacy has been cited by state courts in striking 
down restrictions. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 
831 (Cal. 1997) (striking down the parental consent law); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 
625 P.2d 779, 798–99 (Cal. 1981) (striking down state funding restrictions for abortion); see also, Re-
productive Privacy Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123460–123468 (2018) (codifying Roe).  
23 The Montana Constitution’s enumerated rights to privacy and individual dignity have been cited by 
state courts in overturning abortion restrictions. MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 10; see, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood v. State, No. BDV 95-722, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1117, at *22 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Mont. 
Mar. 12, 1999) (granting permanent injunction against the 24-hour waiting period and state mandated 
informed consent requirements, and finding informed consent requirements unconstitutionally vague 
under state law); Wicklund v. State, No. ADV 97-671, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *23 (1st Jud. 
Dist. Ct. Mont. Feb. 11, 1999) (overturning a parental notice or judicial waiver requirement before a 
minor can obtain an abortion); Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BDV-94-811, 1995 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 795, at 
*24 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Mont. May 22, 1995) (finding a regulation limiting state medical assistance for 
abortion in cases of life endangerment, rape and incest unconstitutional under the state constitution. 
However, these protections do not extend in Montana to post-viability abortions.).  
24See Regulatory Process in Virginia, VA. REG. REGS., http://register.dls.virginia.gov/process.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2018) (requiring specific identification of the regulation to which an amendments or re-
peal is proposed). 
25 See VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (An amendment must first be passed by the majority of the General As-
sembly and then again, by a subsequent session following a general election of the House of Delegates 
before being placed on a special ballot, to become a part of the Constitution only after being approved 
by the majority of Virginians voting on the amendment). 
26 See H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018), (establishing a fundamental right to abor-
tion prior to viability, and limiting enforceability on “any statute that places a burden on a pregnant per-
son’s access to abortion without conferring any legitimate health benefit”). 
27 See generally id. (limiting restrictions placed on abortions to only those “medically necessary”). 
6
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always add additional burdens, then what is the benefit that justifies impos-
ing this additional burden?    
Part I of this paper will explain what the Whole Woman’s Health Act is 
and what it would do, if enacted into law. Then, Part II will cover the his-
torical and legal context of the current statutory and regulatory scheme of 
abortion restrictions in Virginia. This section grapples with the two main 
arguments that proponents of the many statutes and regulations both in Vir-
ginia and elsewhere make: (1) that the state has an inherent interest in the 
life of the fetus that it has a constitutional right to protect and (2) that the 
state has an inherent interest in the “health and wellbeing of the mother” 
which makes these regulations absolutely necessary.28 The former is a ques-
tion purely of law while the latter is a question of fact. 29 This paper argues 
that the laws the Whole Woman’s Health Act would overturn are not 
grounded in health and safety, as claimed, or even if they originally were, 
they no longer serve this purpose. Therefore, treating abortion as different 
for purely ideological reasons goes against the spirit of Whole Woman’s 
Health and is not good policy. Next, Part III of this paper will address 
Whole Woman’s Health and the Whole Woman’s Health Act in the context 
of Casey and NIFLA v. Becerra and conclude that it is consistent with both 
constitutional law and good public policy to enact the Whole Woman’s 
Health Act and reverse the tide of harmful abortion regulations in Virginia. 
Finally, this paper will end by reiterating the significant need for the Whole 
Women’s Health Act in Virginia. 
I.  THE WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ACT: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES  
After Whole Women’s Health was decided in 2016, abortion advocates 
were emboldened to tackle abortion restrictions across the states with bold 
and proactive measures.30 One lane of attack was, of course, the courts.31 
                                                
28 See Steven R. Morrison, Personhood Amendments after Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 67 
CASE W. RES. 447, 450 (2016); Mary Ziegler, Where the Pro-Life Movement Goes Next, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/where-the-pro-life-movement-
goes-next.html.  
29 The Court in Roe agreed that governments have an “important and legitimate interest in protecting the 
potentiality of human life.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). At the same time, that Court con-
cluded “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.” Id. However, 
the growing personhood movement seeks to go beyond expressing an interest in potential life by declar-
ing fetuses legal persons, endowed with the same rights and constitutional protections as people. This is 
not a question that can be easily resolved with facts, scientific or otherwise, as it is subject to many high-
ly variable and deeply held beliefs, but personhood activists continue to push legislation that would 
make fetuses legal persons. See Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion Re-
strictions and Side Effects on Women’s Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75 (2013). 
30 CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, STATE OF THE STATES 2017: A PROACTIVE PUSH IN THE WAKE OF WHOLE 
WOMAN’S HEALTH 5 (2018). 
7
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Across the country, abortion advocates filed lawsuits challenging both new 
and old abortion restrictions.32 In 2017, anti-abortion state legislators con-
tinued to introduce bills restricting abortions, however, more than 400 pro-
abortion legislators made their own inroads in many states, including Illi-
nois, Delaware, Oregon, and New York.33  
Virginia’s pro-choice democratic lawmakers also introduced their own 
proactive bills, including the Whole Woman’s Health Act. This bill was in-
troduced by Delegate Jennifer Boysko (D-Fairfax) and aimed to undo many 
of the worst restrictions on abortion in Virginia.34 In 2017, the Act did not 
even get a hearing.35 The Chair of the House Courts of Justice Committee, 
Delegate David B. Albo (R-Fairfax), sent a letter to the sponsors of “con-
troversial” bills that read, in part, “As you know, the Committee historically 
kills bills associated with liberal politics, and the Governor vetoes bills as-
sociated with conservative politics, if we spend the effort in hearing these 
bills, then we would have much less time to review the bills that actually 
have a chance to become law.”36 In 2018, the bill was re-introduced both in 
the House of Delegates by Delegate Boysko as H.B.1231 and in the State 
Senate by Senator Jennifer McClellan (D-Richmond) as S.B.910.37 This 
time it received a hearing in both chambers, though it did not make it out of 
committee.38  
                                                                                                             
31 See, e.g., Complaint, Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, No. 1:18-cv-1904 (S.D. Ind. 2018); Ted 
Booker, Whole Woman’s Health Alliance Files Lawsuit over Indiana’s Abortion Restrictions, IND. 
ECON. DIG. (June 22, 2018), 
https://indianaeconomicdigest.com/main.asp?SectionID=31&SubSectionID=91&ArticleID=92543.  
32 CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 33. Many of these challenges are still under appeal and 
on their way to the Supreme Court. Even in Texas, abortion advocates filed another suit challenging a 
broader spectrum of regulations than Whole Woman’s Health. Ashley Lopez, Abortion Providers File 
Sweeping Lawsuit Against ‘Burdensome’ Restrictions in Texas, KUT 90.5 (June 14, 2018), 
http://www.kut.org/post/abortion-providers-file-sweeping-lawsuit-against-burdensome-restrictions-
texas. These have not always been successful, with the Eighth Circuit upholding an admitting privileges 
requirement similar to the one struck down in Texas. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 36. 
The United States Supreme Court denied the petition in that case on May 29, 2018. Thus, Planned 
Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley remains precedent for that circuit. Planned Parenthood of Ark. 
& E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017). 
33 CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 8, 16–17, 19, 21. For another example of the growing 
trend towards pro-abortion legislation, see NC Bill Would Expand Access to Abortion and Protect Re-
productive Freedom, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/nc-bill-
would-expand-access-abortion-and-protect-reproductive-freedom. 
34 H.B. 2186, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017). 
35 Gregory S. Schneider, Existential Debate of Lawmaking: If It’s Doomed Anyway, Why Take It Up?, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/existential-debate-
of-lawmaking-if-its-doomed-anyway-why-take-it-up/2017/02/02/ae9ba600-e979-11e6-bf6f-
301b6b443624_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5c5fa8d7b5e1. 
36 Id. (Delegate Boysko, the sponsor of the bill held a press conference protesting the move). 
37 H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); S.B. 910, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
2018).  
38 Whole Women’s Health Act: Hearing on S.B. 910 Before the S. Comm. on Education and Health, 
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The Whole Woman’s Health Act would enshrine in the Virginia Code a 
pregnant person’s “fundamental right to obtain an abortion” and would en-
sure that no statute or regulation would be construed to prohibit abortion 
before viability or when “necessary to protect the life or health of the preg-
nant person.”39 The Act would also preserve the Whole Woman’s Health 
holding that any statute that places a burden on a pregnant person’s access 
to abortion without conferring any legitimate health benefit is unenforcea-
ble.40 Additionally, it would expand the category of those who can perform 
a first trimester abortion to include physician’s assistants, midwives li-
censed by the Board of Medicine acting and within the scope of practice, 
and other advanced practice clinicians (APCs) subject to licensing require-
ments by the Board of Medicine and the Board of Nursing and acting within 
their scope of practice.41 The Act would also broaden the category of those 
who can perform second trimester abortions to include clinicians acting un-
der supervision of a physician and eliminate the requirement that second 
trimester abortions be performed in a licensed hospital.42 Furthermore, the 
Act would eliminate the TRAP statute, classifying facilities that perform 
five or more first trimester abortions as a hospital, and the ultrasound and 
written consent requirements.43 Lastly, the Act would eliminate the crimi-
nalization of abortion and would allow the sale of insurance policies that 
provide coverage for abortions through the exchanges established in the 
Commonwealth pursuant to the federal Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.44  
                                                                                                             
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018) (the bill was passed by indefinitely on an 8-7 vote); Whole 
Women’s Health Act: Hearing on H.B. 1231 Before the H. Comm. for Courts of Justice, 2018 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018) (the bill was left in Court of Justice committee on February 15, 2018). 
39 H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). 
40 Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016); H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). 
41 H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). 
42 Id.    
43 Id. 
44 Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). While the Whole Woman’s Health Act would decrimi-
nalize abortion in one sense, it would not make forced abortions suddenly legal. Attempting to or actual-
ly causing a miscarriage with the intent to end a pregnancy via a non-medical procedure (e.g., striking a 
pregnant person with an object, poisoning, etc.) would still be covered by the feticide statute, and an 
unlicensed healthcare provider who violates a section of the Whole Woman’s Health Act while perform-
ing an abortion would be practicing medicine, nursing, or midwifery without a license which is punisha-
ble as a Class 1 Misdemeanor. VA. CODE § 18.2-32.2 (2018); VA. CODE § 54.1-111 (2018). If someone 
is convicted of this offense three times, the charge is upgraded to a Class 6 Felony. VA. CODE § 54.1-
111 (2018). Furthermore, any licensed healthcare provider who violated any provision of this article 
would be subject to discipline or loss of licensure and/or medical malpractice lawsuits in the same man-
ner as any other violation of a health regulation. See, e.g., H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Va. 2018). Taking abortion out of the criminal code will simply cease treating it differently from any 
other medical procedure. Id. 
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II.  IT IS NOT ABOUT HEALTH – A HISTORY IN THREE ACTS 
Attacks on abortion did not stop after Roe. In the beginning, little effort 
was made to hide behind the veneer of women’s health and well-being.45 
When United States House of Representative member Henry Hyde (R-
Illinois) introduced the Hyde Amendment in 1976 to stop government 
health coverage of abortion care, he explained that “[he] would certainly 
like to prevent, if [he] could legally, anybody from having an abortion: a 
rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the 
only vehicle available is the [Medicaid] bill.”46 In its current form, the Hyde 
Amendment prevents not just enrollees of Medicaid, but also enrollees in 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, the Medicare program, and oth-
ers, from receiving abortion care funded by the government unless the life 
of the pregnant person is threatened or the pregnancy is a result of rape or 
incest.47 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Hyde Amendment in 
1980, justifying its decision by reasoning that the problem of access was 
caused by the women’s poverty, not government action, and while govern-
ment could not place an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to pursue an 
abortion, it was not required to “guarantee” the right to an abortion.48  
The anti-abortion movement lauded this decision and clung onto this line 
of reasoning well into the late 1980s and early 1990s. They believe that 
since “a human being is formed at conception of equal moral value to born 
persons; there is (virtually) no justification for ending that life; hence abor-
tion is murder.” 49 Anti-abortion advocates and legislators were thus willing 
to push for legislation purely and openly designed to reduce the number of 
abortions, without supplying superfluous justifications or feigning concern 
for the pregnant person.50  
                                                
45 See Mary Ziegler, The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty: Knowledge, Science, and Abortion, 2018 WIS. 
L. REV. 317, 320, 343–45 (2018) (describing the anti-abortion movement which, while funded in the 
1960’s by the Catholic Church among other ideologically religious backers, “made deliberately secular 
arguments, spotlighting what pro-lifers described as the right to life of the unborn child.”). 
46 Champlin, supra note 16, at 8–12. 
47 ALYSSA LLAMAS ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACTS OF STATE-LEVEL ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 3 
(2016). 
48 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961)) 
(“The guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a source of substantive rights or 
liberties, but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other 
governmental activity. It is well settled that where a statutory classification does not itself impinge on a 
right or liberty protected by the Constitution, the validity of classification must be sustained unless "the 
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of [any legitimate governmental] 
objective."); Champlin, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
49 Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1014 (2007).  
50 See id. 
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In the late 1990s, the focus began to shift. The same people who had 
been content ignoring the point of view of the woman involved in the equa-
tion suddenly found the other interests discussed in Roe compelling, per-
haps because they faced growing support for women’s rights and abortion 
rights.51 To rebrand the movement as women-centered, and not fetus-
centered as it previously had been, David Reardon, one of the movement’s 
“thought leaders,” urged anti-abortion advocates to “always – ALWAYS – 
place our arguments for the unborn in the middle of a pro-woman sandwich. 
Our compassion for the woman must be voiced both first and last in all our 
arguments, and in a manner which shows that our concern for women is a 
primary and integral part of our opposition to abortion.”52 A stark distilla-
tion of a pro-women argument divorced from the fetus-centric consideration 
has been summarized thus: “insofar as motherhood is a constitutive end of 
women’s well-being, abortion harms women; thus, abortion is wrong and 
should be prohibited, restricted, or avoided when possible regardless of the 
moral status of the fetus.”53 
It is from these at least partly disingenuous beginnings that one can trace 
the changes in the policy track taken by anti-abortion advocates and legisla-
tures through the early to mid-2000s and 2010s, as TRAP laws sprung up 
like weeds from state house to state house under the banner of protecting 
women’s health.54 President George W. Bush’s “partial birth abortion ban,” 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2007 and justified by Justice Kenne-
dy under the guise of protecting women from “regret” and emotional dis-
tress since they would “struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow 
more profound” upon learning details of the procedure, leaning on a per-
ceived medical uncertainty to rationalize the decision to not interfere with 
the legislature on this question.55 The Court used women’s health to justify 
                                                
51 David S. Cohen, Will Rejecting Woman-Protective Justifications for Antiabortion Laws Increase 
Harassment and Violence?, 94 CONTRACEPTION 441, 441–42 (2016); Lydia Saad, Public Opinion About 
Abortion - an In-depth Review, GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2002), https://news.gallup.com/poll/9904/public-
opinion-about-abortion-indepth-review.aspx (“In the initial years after the Roe v. Wade decision, the 
number of Americans holding the extreme positions was roughly the same, at the 20% level. In the 
1980s, attitudes gradually shifted toward the pro-choice position, so that by 1990, the liberal extreme 
outnumbered the conservative extreme by a more than two-to-one margin. This trend peaked in June 
1992, with 34% saying abortion should be legal in all cases and only 13% saying it should be complete-
ly banned.”). 
52 David C. Reardon, MAKING ABORTION RARE: A HEALING STRATEGY FOR A DIVIDED NATION 26 
(1996). 
53 Itzel Mayans & Moisés Vaca, The Paternalistic Argument Against Abortion, 33 HYPATIA 22 (2018). 
54 See, e.g., Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: State Trends at Mid-
year GUTTMACHER INST. (July 21, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/07/laws-affecting-
reproductive-health-and-rights-state-trends-midyear-2016; see also id. (showing the philosophical back-
ground of state trends concerning abortions). 
55 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007); ALEX DIBRANCO, WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH’S 
UNEXPECTED WIN FOR SCIENCE 18 (2016). 
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its decision despite the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists’ (ACOG) argument that there was a medical consensus at the time 
that intact dilation and extraction (D&E) procedures were “safest and of-
fer[ed] significant benefits for women suffering from certain conditions that 
ma[de] the potential complications of non-intact D&E especially danger-
ous.”56 The Court did not even give serious consideration to the question of 
the lack of exemptions to the prohibition and weighed the paternalistic 
opinion of the legislature above medical evidence and expertise.57  
A.  Act I – Vestiges of the Pre-Roe Era  
In Virginia, as elsewhere, many of the laws challenged by the provider-
driven Falls Church v. Oliver lawsuit and targeted by the Whole Woman’s 
Health Act were put in place with the specific aim of reducing access to 
abortion.58 Abortion was illegal in Virginia prior to Roe.59 After 1973, the 
legislature, instead of legalizing all abortion except in some particular cir-
cumstances, legalized only certain exceptions to the criminal statute without 
getting rid of the statute all together.60 This means that in Virginia, if some-
one is not performing an abortion as prescribed by the law, they are com-
mitting a felony offense.61  
If the Whole Woman’s Health Act were to be enacted in Virginia, two 
statutes that currently restrict a woman’s access to a safe and legal abortion 
would be overturned. Those statutes, the “Physicians-Only Law” and the 
hospital requirement for all post-first trimester abortions (“Hospital Re-
                                                
56 DIBRANCO, supra note 55, at 18 (citing Press Release, American Congress of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, ACOG Statement on the US Supreme Court Decision Upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003 (Apr. 18, 2007) (on file with author)). 
57 See Chelsea M. Donaldson, Note, Constitutional Law/Reproductive Justice – Breaking The TRAP: 
How Whole Woman’s Health Protects Abortion Access, and the Substantive Due Process Clauses Re-
buke of Anti-Abortion Regulations, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 285 (2018). 
58 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 40. 
59 VA. CODE § 18.2-71 (2018), invalidated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
60 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 19. This Complaint was filed as I was writing this Article, 
and I found the nomenclature and classification used therein useful and borrowed it for this Article. 
Most of it is common parlance in the reproductive rights and advocacy field in Virginia, but I should 
give credit to the drafters of the Complaint for so succinctly framing the problems of the various por-
tions of Virginia’s abortion statutory and regulatory scheme. 
61 Criminalization of abortion is another issue entirely, and one worthy of its own detailed review. It 
should be noted here that prosecutors in Virginia have found creative ways to prosecute women for 
pregnancy outcomes. For example, consider the case of Michelle Frances Roberts in Chesterfield who 
currently on trial for an alleged self-induced abortion even though the statute presupposes the culprit 
inducing an abortion “of another”, and the case of Katherine Dellis who was prosecuted, convicted, and 
later pardoned of a felony concealment of a dead body following a miscarriage. E.g. VA. CODE § 18.2-
71 (2018); Justin Jouvenal, Virginia Governor Pardons Woman Convicted of Disposing of Stillborn Fe-
tus, WASH. POSt (June 1, 2018); Mark Bowes, Judge Clears Way for Prosecution of Chesterfield Wom-
an Charged with Self-Aborting Late-Term Fetus, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 27, 2017). 
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quirement”), were both enacted in 1975.62 A lot has changed since 1975 in 
the field of abortion medicine, making both statutes obsolete.63 The current 
code criminalizes all abortions in Virginia except those performed by a li-
censed physician, with violations punishable as a Class 4 Felony with a sen-
tence of up to ten years and exorbitant civil fines.64 To escape a criminal 
penalty, second-trimester abortions must be performed in a licensed hospi-
tal, which Virginia’s Department of Health has interpreted to mean facilities 
operating in compliance with the “Outpatient Surgical Hospital” regula-
tions, including physical facility, personnel, and procedure requirements too 
onerous for many independent abortion providers to satisfy.65  
In an interesting twist, the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of 
Virginia filed a Motion to Dismiss the Falls Church v. Oliver Complaint, 
arguing that the current law does not, in fact, prevent facilities, such as 
those of the plaintiffs, from performing second-trimester abortions, since 
they are classified as hospitals under the TRAP statute.66 This is a novel in-
terpretation of the statute, one that has not been adopted by either Virginia’s 
Department of Health or the abortion facilities themselves.67 No court has 
ruled on this interpretation yet and it is unclear whether a court would agree 
with the Attorney General’s argument given the legislative and regulatory 
history of the TRAP statute and associated regulations. 68 If it is a fair inter-
                                                
62 VA. CODE §§ 18.2-72–18.2-73 (2018); see also Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 36. 
63 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 20, 31–32; Amanda Chatel, What Getting an Abortion 
was Like in the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80’s Compared to Now, BUSTLE (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.bustle.com/p/what-getting-abortion-was-like-in-the-60s-70s-80s-compared-to-now-
7977732. 
64 See VA. CODE § 18.2-72 (2018); VA. CODE § 32.1-27(C) (2018); Falls Church Complaint, supra note 
9, at 36. 
65 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (2018); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-410-10, 5-410-1150, 5-410-1380 
(2018); see Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 27–28 (noting the “thicket of extensive administra-
tive and bureaucratic requirements” for outpatient surgical hospitals).  
66 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at 6–7, Falls Church Med. Ctr. v. Oliver, No. 3:18-cv-428 
(E.D. Va. 2018) (“Plaintiffs here have suffered no injury in fact because they are not subject to criminal 
prosecution under Section 18.2-73. Section 18.2-73 requires second-trimester abortions to be ‘performed 
in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health.’ Plaintiffs argue that their facilities are not 
‘hospitals’ under Section 18.2-73, but that argument misreads Virginia law…each plaintiff satisfies ex-
actly the definition of ‘hospital’ under Section 32.1-123 … each plaintiff is a ‘hospital’ for purposes of 
Section 18.2-73…As a result, plaintiffs are not subject to criminal liability under Section 18.2-73.”); 
Laura Vozzella, Virginia Attorney General Files Motion to Dismiss Lawsuit Challenging State Abortion 
Restrictions, WASH. POST (July 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/ag-
herring-files-motion-to-dismiss-lawsuit-challenging-virginia-abortion-restrictions/2018/07/14/4ebfd6ac-
86da-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_story.html?utm_term=.62fcf874ec58.  
67 Virginia Coalition to Protect Women’s Health, Comment Letter on Amendments for Regulations for 
Licensure of Abortion Facilities (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/viewcomments.cfm?commentid=39140 (pointing out that this require-
ment is not medically necessary). 
68 See generally Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 17, 20; Victoria Cobb, What’s Mark Herring 
Doing, THE FAMILY FOUND. (July 16, 2018), http://www.familyfoundation.org/blog/whats-mark-
herring-doing (Commenting that abortion opponents are similarly flummoxed by the Attorney General’s 
13
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pretation, the legislature could use the Whole Woman’s Health Act to offer 
clarity in this regard.   
As currently practiced and interpreted by Virginia’s administration and 
abortion providers, both of the aforementioned 1975 statutes are out of 
touch with current medical science; viewed through the lens of Whole 
Woman’s Health’s balancing test, both statutes create burdens without con-
ferring medical benefits on patients, placing their constitutionality in ques-
tion.69 Limiting the kind of clinicians who can perform abortions in Virginia 
artificially limits the supply of abortion providers. Virginia’s regulatory 
scheme mimics the Virginia Code, preventing APCs, like licensed nurse 
practitioners, certified nurse-midwives, and physician assistants from 
providing abortion care.70 At the same time, APCs perform other, more 
dangerous procedures in medical offices all across the Commonwealth eve-
ry day with no interference. 71 Virginia’s Code even allows certified nurse 
midwives to assist patients with labor and delivery during home-births de-
spite the fact that giving birth is more likely to lead to death or complica-
tions than a first trimester surgical abortion. 72 Moreover, other states allow 
APCs to provide abortion care.73 
This restriction is especially peculiar when one considers the case of 
medication abortions. Medication abortion is a method of ending an early 
pregnancy with oral medications. It is extremely safe and associated with 
                                                                                                             
argument, noting that this interpretation “wasn’t the General Assembly’s intent at all, as evidenced by 
the past six years of implementation.”). 
69 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 25–28; see R. Alta Charo, Whole Women’s Victory—Or 
Not?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 809, 810 (2016) (“The Whole Women’s Health decision also made more 
explicit that whether a law constitutes an ‘undue burden’ on abortion rights requires looking at whether 
its purported benefits are reasonable in light of the limitations it imposes.”). 
70 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 36–37; see generally Carole Joffe & Susan Yanow, Ad-
vanced Practice Clinicians as Abortion Providers: Current Developments in the United States, 12 
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 198, 199 (2004) (Defining advanced clinical practice more expansively as a 
“nurse practitioners, certified nurse-midwives and physician assistants, who fill distinct professional 
roles in US health care…Nurse practitioners may specialize in any one of a number of fields, including 
women’s health. Certified nurse-midwives provide a full range of ob/gyn care. Physician assistants are 
not nurses, but health professionals with advanced medical training. Like nurse practitioners, physician 
assistants may specialize in a range of fields, including women’s health or obstetrics and gynecolo-
gy…”).  
71 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 37. 
72 See VA. CODE § 54.1-2957.03(B) (2018); Kaiya A. Lyons, Proscribing Prescriptions: A Legal Analy-
sis of State Off-Label Restrictions on Medication Abortion, SUA SPONTE (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://editions.lib.umn.edu/suasponte/2016/11/21/proscribing-prescriptions-a-legal-analysis-of-state-off-
label-restrictions-on-medication-abortion/ (“In fact, contrary to state laws that suggest abortions are 
high-risk procedures, at least one study demonstrates that early surgical abortions are safer than giving 
birth.”). 
73 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 36; see also An Overview of Abortion Laws, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-
abortion-laws (“42 states require an abortion to be performed by a licensed physician.”). 
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few complications because it requires no anesthesia.74 Medication abortion 
involves no surgery or procedure, it is simply the taking of pills.75  Compli-
cations after medication abortions occur only after the patient has left the 
clinic and are extremely rare.76 Importantly, the rates of adverse events fol-
lowing a medication abortion are far lower than those associated with preg-
nancy and childbirth.77 One would hardly think that a licensed physician’s 
attention is required while taking a pill with such a significant safety record. 
However, across the country, these kinds of restrictions are hardly un-
common. Thirty-four states have similar physician-only laws on the books, 
even for medication-only abortions, and nineteen states prohibit telemedi-
cine of medication abortion, thus requiring that clinicians prescribing the 
medicine be physically present in the room when the patient takes the med-
ication.78 A veritable plethora of medical research, however, demonstrates 
that medication abortion can be safely and effectively administered through 
telemedicine by APCs and does not have to be performed by a licensed 
physician to be safe and effective.79 Reducing access by artificially lower-
ing the supply of clinicians available to administer medication abortions 
places an undue burden on patients who want an early and safe termination 
of their pregnancy. Medication abortion allows for abortion very early in 
the pregnancy, something that is both safer than later term abortions and 
preferred by many American women.80  
Paradoxically, should a woman suffer a miscarriage or should she have 
retained tissue in her uterus after an abortion, trained APCs in Virginia are 
able to “safely provide misoprostol and/or mifepristone to facilitate the 
                                                
74 See Medical Abortion, MAYO CLINIC (July 7, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-
procedures/medical-abortion/about/pac-20394687.  
75 Id. 
76 Kelly Cleland et al., Significant Adverse Events and Outcomes After Medical Abortion, 121 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 166, 169 (2013) (finding that clinically significant adverse outcomes were 
rare in abortions administered by Planned Parenthood affiliates); see also Medical Abortion, supra note 
74 (listing the common complications that are associated with medical abortions); Nadine Shehab et al., 
Emergency Department Visits for Antibiotic-Associated Adverse Events, 47 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 735, 738 (2008) (showing the rates of emergency department visits for common antibiotics); 
Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Incidence of Emergency Department Visits and Complications After Abor-
tion, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 175, 178 (2015) (showing the rates of complications for medical 
abortions). 
77 Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion and 
Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 215 (2012), 
https://journals.lww.com/greenjournal/Fulltext/2012/02000/The_Comparative_Safety_of_Legal_Induce
d_Abortion.3.aspx. 
78 LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 12. 
79 Id.  
80 Linda J. Beckman, Abortion in the United States: The Continuing Controversy, 27 FEMINISM & 
PSYCHOL. 101, 107 (2016). 
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evacuation of the uterus.”81 These are the same drugs that must be adminis-
tered by a physician in the course of the abortion, but they do not require 
the same kind of oversight or scrutiny when administered for related medi-
cal conditions, despite there being no difference in the associated risk to the 
patient.82 
The case for a physician-only law for surgical abortions is no sounder. 
The Falls Church v. Oliver Complaint states in part, “[t]here is no statisti-
cally significant benefit, as measured by complication rates, failure rates, or 
any other outcome, when aspiration abortions83 are performed by physicians 
as compared to APCs.”84 And with respect to first trimester surgical abor-
tions, studies do bear this out.85 With a growing shortage of licensed physi-
cians who specialize in patient-oriented care, including primary healthcare, 
there is a growing movement to broaden the scope of practice for APC’s 
across all fields to keep up with demand for medical services.86 Treating 
abortion differently than any other similarly situated medical procedures, 
and thus limiting the number of medical professionals able to assist with 
abortion care, does nothing to advance patient safety and only restricts ac-
cess to safe abortions.  
The other 1975 vestige, the Hospital Requirement, did once have some 
basis in medical reality. At the time, the primary method of second tri-
mester abortion was induction.87 A patient’s labor was induced by a physi-
                                                
81 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 37; see also Abortion with Pills vs. Miscarriage: Demystify-
ing the Experience, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK, http://www.nwhn.org/abortion-pills-vs-
miscarriage-demystifying-experience/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
82 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 37. 
83 Suction abortion (also called vacuum aspiration) is the most common type of in-clinic abortion. It uses 
gentle suction to empty a woman’s uterus. In-Clinic Abortion, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures (last visited Sept. 25, 
2018). 
84 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 38. 
85 Tracy Weitz et al., Advancing Scope of Practice for Advanced Practice Clinicians: More Than a Mat-
ter of Access, ASS’N REPROD. HEALTH PROFS. (Aug. 2009), http://arhp.org/publications-and-
resources/contraception-journal/august-2009; see NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING, 
CHANGES IN HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS’ SCOPE OF PRACTICE: LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 3 
(2009); Mary Ann Freedman et al., Comparison of Complication Rates in First Trimester Abortions Per-
formed by Physician Assistants and Physicians, AM J. PUB. HEALTH 550, 552 (1986); Marlene B. 
Goldman et al., Physician Assistants as Providers of Surgically Induced Abortion Services, AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1352, 1352–53 (2004); Diana Taylor et al., When Politics Trumps Evidence: Legislative or 
Regulatory Exclusion of Abortion From Advanced Practice Clinician Scope of Practice, J. MIDWIFERY 
& WOMEN’S HEALTH 4, 4–5 (2010);  IK Warriner et al., Rates of Complication in First-Trimester Man-
ual Vacuum Aspiration Abortion Done by Doctors and Mid-Level Providers in South Africa and Vi-
etnam: A Randomized Controlled Equivalence Trial, LANCET 1965, 1965, 1969 (2006). 
86 John K. Iglehart, Expanding the Role of Advanced Nurse Practitioners - Risks and Rewards, NEW 
ENG. J. MED. (2013), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMhpr1301084 (discussing the neces-
sary expansion of scope-of-practice laws to meet the need for more primary care providers). 
87 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 20. 
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cian by means of an injection of medication directly into the patient’s am-
niotic fluid. Such an injection resulted in the patient undergoing the full la-
bor process as if they were giving birth, a painful, potentially dangerous and 
traumatic procedure requiring close monitoring and potential medical inter-
vention and lasting long enough to sometimes require an overnight stay at a 
hospital.88 Often, the patient’s retained placenta had to be surgically re-
moved, leading to other potential complications.89 At the time, therefore, 
both the American Public Health Association (APHA) and ACOG issued 
opinions stating that second trimester abortions should take place in a hos-
pital due to the associated risks and the need for monitoring and care 
throughout.90  
Today, induction abortions are very uncommon in the United States, both 
because of the risks and the associated cost. 91 Aspiration abortion and D&E 
abortions have superseded induction as the methods of choice because they 
are safer and cheaper.92 Both are office-based, out-patient procedures that 
do not require hospital facilities.93 While medicine has moved on, the law 
has not. The Hospital Requirement, as it has been interpreted, has led to 
Virginia having only two facilities capable of providing abortions after thir-
teen weeks.94 Both are surgical centers and are required to have “sterile op-
erating rooms of at least 150 square feet or more, depending on sedation 
level provided; patient corridors at least five or six feet wide, depending on 
location; and similarly specific requirements regarding HVAC systems, fin-
                                                
88 See Marc Bygdeman & Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson, An Historical Overview of Second Trimester 
Abortion Methods, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 196,196–98 (2008). 
89 See id. 
90 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 20.  
91 See Chatel, supra note 63; Bonnie Scott Jones & Tracy A. Weitz, Legal Barriers to Second-Trimester 
Abortion Provision and Public Health Consequences, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 623, 626–28 (2009), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2661467/. 
92 See Jones & Weitz, supra 91, at 626–27. The divisions between first and second trimester are some-
what artificial, as “[a]bortion care is best understood as a continuum of techniques—from induction to 
dilation and evacuation and from intact to removal in multiple pieces—rather than as comprising distinct 
categories,” making the arbitrary distinctions between late first term and early second term abortions 
specious, forcing pregnant people to get procedures at much higher costs when the actual procedures 
themselves, nor the risks associated, would perceptibly differ, based solely on an arbitrary number of 
weeks. Id. at 623. 
93 See Jones & Weitz, supra note 91, at 627 (2009) (stating that "Numerous more-minor surgical proce-
dures may be performed in physicians' offices and outpatient clinical settings..."); see also NAT'L 
ABORTION FED'N, 2017 CLINICAL POLICY GUIDELINES FOR ABORTION CARE 32 (2017) (stating that 
“Abortion by dilation and evacuation (D&E) after 14 weeks from LMP is a safe outpatient procedure 
when performed by appropriately trained clinicians in medical offices, freestanding clinics, ambulatory 
surgery centers, and hospitals.”). 
94 Vozzella, supra note 19. And the costs are hefty, with the procedure costing $1,700 at the Richmond 
clinic, not including transportation, overnight stays before the procedure for the twenty-four hour wait-
period if necessary, missed work, child care, and other costs. See Fees, MED. CTR. FOR WOMEN, 
http://richmondmedctrforwomen.com/fees/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
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ishes for ceilings, walls, and floors, and recovery room dimensions and lay-
out.”95 This is in addition to the rigorous and expensive Certificate of Public 
Need process that surgical centers have to go through before they can re-
ceive a license in the first place.96 
As they apply to the Hospital Requirement, both ACOG and APHA have 
changed their recommendations, acknowledging the change in medical 
practice.97 Other states without such requirements have not seen a deteriora-
tion in care. In fact, research shows that abortions provided in surgical cen-
ters do not lead to a statistically significant decrease in complications or ad-
verse results than those performed in out-patient doctors’ offices.98 In 
addition to the lack of medical evidence supporting the law, the statute in-
cludes no exception for cases where a pregnant person’s life or health is in 
danger and they need an emergency abortion in their second trimester.99 
Even though there are many more first trimester abortions than second, se-
cond trimester abortions are sometimes necessary.100 The lack of adequate 
access to affordable second trimester abortions has a greater impact on low 
income people and people of color as well as those seeking an abortion for a 
wanted pregnancy after discovering a medical reason to have one – punish-
ing those least likely to be able to absorb the added financial burden.101 
Studies have shown that “black women, those with lower educational lev-
els, those relying on financial assistance for the procedure, and those who 
recognized the pregnancy later than seven weeks” after their last menstrual 
period “were more likely to have received abortions at or after 13 weeks.”102 
                                                
95 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 32. 
96 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-220-20 (2018); see also VA. CODE § 32.1-102.3 (2018) (discussing the cri-
teria for determining the need sufficient for the obtainment of a Certificate of Public Need). 
97 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 37; see also NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, supra note 93, at 
32 (stating that “Abortion by dilation and evacuation (D&E) after 14 weeks from LMP is a safe outpa-
tient procedure when performed by appropriately trained clinicians in medical offices, freestanding clin-
ics, ambulatory surgery centers, and hospitals,” based on numerous studies and professional guidelines, 
including the 2013 ACOG Abortion Practice Bulletin for Second Trimester Abortions from 2013). 
98 Advancing New Standards in Reprod. Health, Safety of Abortion in Ambulatory Surgical Centers vs. 
Office-Based Settings, UCSF MED. CTR. (June 2018), 
https://www.ansirh.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/safety_of_abortion_in_ascs_fact_sheet.pdf 
[hereinafter ANSRH]. 
99 H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 35.  
100 Jones & Weitz, supra note 91, at 623–24. 
101 See id. at 624 (“Several studies indicate that the factors causing women to delay abortions until the 
second trimester include cost and access barriers, late detection of pregnancy, and difficulty whether to 
continue the pregnancy. In part because of their increased vulnerability to these barriers, low-income 
women and women of color are more likely than are other women to have second-trimester abortions.”); 
see also Margie Del Castillo, Virginia Latina Advocacy TRAP Comment, VA. REG. TOWN HALL (July 
31, 2014), https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/viewcomments.cfm?commentid=35924 (stating that Virgin-
ia’s regulations on women’s health centers create additional barriers to quality healthcare for Latinas 
which further delay and increase the cost of abortion care for low-income Latinas). 
102 LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 7. 
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Abortion regulations do not do their harm in isolation. Increasing the time, 
distance and cost necessary to receive an abortion can push the wanted 
abortion further and further out of reach for the already marginalized.   
B. Act II – Two Trip Mandatory Delay Law  
In the early 2000s, Virginia passed its own informed consent law, requir-
ing that patients seeking an abortion give “informed consent” before receiv-
ing an abortion.103 They must also be offered materials drafted by the state 
that contain inaccurate and biased information about the abortion procedure 
and fetal development, which they can accept or refuse.104 Should the pa-
tient accept the materials, they must receive them in person at least twenty-
four hours before the procedure, or if the patient chooses to get them by 
mail, the materials must be sent to them at least seventy-two hours before 
the procedure.105  
In 2012, Virginia passed an additional law that required the patient to 
undergo a transabdominal ultrasound and then wait twenty-four hours be-
fore being able to actually undergo an abortion procedure.106 The statute 
states that the ultrasound is done for the purpose of determining the gesta-
tional age of the fetus.107 The addition of the mandatory ultrasound turned 
Virginia into a Two Trip Mandatory Delay State.108 
In addition to performing the ultrasound, however, “[i]f gestational age 
cannot be determined by a transabdominal ultrasound, then the patient un-
dergoing the abortion shall be verbally offered other ultrasound imaging to 
determine gestational age, which she may refuse.”109 Medically speaking, 
before a certain point in the pregnancy, an ultrasound is not the best method 
of determining gestational age and, in fact, is not part of standard medical 
practice.110  However, this procedure is not required if the woman seeking 
                                                
103 VA. CODE § 18.2-76(A) (2018); see also VA. CODE § 18.2-76(D) (2018) (defining “informed con-
sent”). 
104 See VA. CODE § 18.2-76(D)(5) (2018); see also VA. CODE § 18.2-76(F) (2018) (describing the con-
tents of the printed materials); NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 2003 STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT 3 (2004) 
(stating that Virginia passed bills in 2003 adding requirements to biased counseling statutes already en-
acted). 
105 VA. CODE § 18.2-76(D)(5) (2018). 
106 Id. § 18.2-76(B). 
107 Id.  
108 Id.; Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 23. 
109 VA. CODE § 18.2-76(B) (2018). 
110 See NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 2018 CLINICAL POLICY GUIDELINES FOR ABORTION CARE 14-15 
(2018) (“The use of ultrasound is not a requirement for the provision of first trimester abortion care. 
Proper use of ultrasound may inform clinical decision-making in abortion care...According to the Amer-
ican Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine (AIUM), in collaboration with the American College of Obstet-
rics and Gynecology and the American College of Radiology, a ‘limited ultrasound examination’ is per-
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an abortion is a “victim of rape or incest” and “if the incident was reported 
to law-enforcement authorities.”111 In addition to performing the ultrasound, 
the provider must offer the patient the opportunity to “view the ultrasound 
image, receive a printed copy of the ultrasound image and hear the fetal 
heart tones” and “shall obtain from the woman written certification that this 
opportunity was offered and whether or not it was accepted.”112 Finally, the 
law provides that a woman living more than 100 miles away from an abor-
tion provider can obtain the ultrasound two hours before the procedure.113 
The history of the informed consent requirement is rooted in the anti-
choice movement. Part of the informed consent law is based on the original 
model statute from Ohio, which was championed by pro-life advocates like 
Jane Hubbard, the President of Akron Right to Life. She insists that it “‘en-
sure[s] that a woman who decides to abort her child will have… scientifi-
cally and medically accurate information[.]’”114 Though not as prescriptive 
or as extreme as the Akron version, which was struck down by the Supreme 
Court in 1983,115 the Virginia requirement remains problematic and ulti-
mately is based in the same anti-choice origins. 
The very fact that the ultrasound requirement is not linked to medical ne-
cessity, which is inconsistent with medical practice, and sets the waiting pe-
riod cut off arbitrarily at 100 miles is evidence that the requirement bears 
little relation to patient health and safety.116 While there is some slim evi-
dence that “‘the process of having the ultrasound image described and dis-
played may be the tipping point that leads a woman who was in the process 
of making her decision about whether to have an abortion decide to contin-
ue her pregnancy,’” this is not necessarily a desirable outcome, as research 
shows that women who do not receive wanted abortions face many negative 
consequences. 117 
Like most of the other restrictions on abortion care, the ultrasound re-
quirement creates a substantial obstacle for those already facing significant 
barriers to healthcare access. The additional costs of a second visit, which 
                                                                                                             
formed when a specific question requires investigation.”). 
111 VA. CODE § 18.2-76(B) (2018). 
112 Id. § 18.2-76(C). 
113 Id. § 18.2-76(B). 
114 Ziegler, supra note 45, at 336.  
115 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, 462 U.S. 416, 420–26 (1983). 
116 In fact, having these requirements can lead to patients not receiving the best abortion services for 
them, especially when combined with the plethora of other laws and regulations already impeding ac-
cess. See COMM. ON REPROD. HEALTH SERVS., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., THE SAFETY AND 
QUALITY OF ABORTION CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (2018). 
117 LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 11 (quoting USHMA D. UPADHYAY ET AL., EVALUATING THE 
IMPACT OF A MANDATORY PRE-ABORTION ULTRASOUND VIEWING LAW: A MIXED METHODS STUDY 20 
(2017)). 
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are not covered by health insurance or government-provided health insur-
ance plans (due to that pesky Hyde amendment), increases the burden for 
those traveling less than 100 miles to a clinic.118 For hourly employees, 
part-time workers, and low-wage workers an extra day off work can make 
the difference between making rent or not, and in some instances even 
keeping a job or not. Childcare costs, transportation costs, and potential 
costs for overnight lodging if a patient is able to get back-to-back appoint-
ments add up quickly. These costs fall particularly heavily on people of 
color, those living in rural areas, the low-income, the undocumented, and 
the otherwise marginalized.119  
Even worse, while abortion is very safe, risks increase with gestation.120 
Because of limits on third-trimester abortions, patients can lose their ability 
to obtain a legal abortion if they do not make it to a provider in time.121 
Twenty-four hours can stretch into days or weeks when one considers the 
fact that clinics do not have abortion providers on staff every day of the 
week, patients’ work and child-care needs can make planning two back-to-
back appointments difficult, and patients seeking an abortion just before a 
gestational limit can be priced out of an abortion or prohibited from obtain-
ing a legal abortion due to the delay.122 Research shows that women in 
states with waiting periods are more likely than those in states without to 
have at least two weeks pass between the initial call to schedule an abortion 
and the abortion itself.123  
There is also research demonstrating that women who receive provider 
counseling, mandated by state law and drafted by the state, find it less 
“beneficial” than patients who receive counseling not prescribed by the 
                                                
118 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 52. 
119 Id. 
120 LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 10; Suzanne Zane et al., Abortion-Related Mortality in the United 
States: 1998–2010, 126 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 258, 262 (2015) (describing statistical results 
which show that abortion-related mortality rates increase with gestational age). 
121 See RACHEL K. JONES & JENNA JERMAN, TIME TO APPOINTMENT AND DEALYS IN ACCESSING CARE 
AMONG U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS 3 (2016) (explaining that timeliness is key to obtaining a legal abor-
tion because of time requirements for first-trimester abortions and decreased availability of second-
trimester abortions). 
122 See LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 23 (explaining that the twenty-four hour waiting period can 
turn in to two weeks due to reasons such as limited appointment availability, conflicting work schedules, 
finding transportation, and coordinating child care); see also JONES & JERMAN, supra note 122, at 13 
(explaining that due to the higher expense and lower availability of second trimester abortions delays 
can make abortion inaccessible); Kari White et al., Experiences Accessing Abortion Care in Alabama 
among Women Traveling for Services, 26 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 298, 302 (2016) (explaining the 
difficulties in arranging multiple appointments).  
123 LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 23; see JONES & JERMAN, supra note 122, at 11 (explaining that 
due to the higher expense and lower availability of second trimester abortions delays can make abortion 
inaccessible). 
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state.124 Clinicians who perform abortions are already bound, like other 
medical professionals, by training and licensing requirements and codes of 
ethics to provide “adequate and appropriate information about procedures 
and receive patients’ consent before performing them.”125 Forcing these 
medical professionals to go against their training and engage in what can be 
termed, in essence, “ideological speech” forces them to “commit an untena-
ble ethical and professional wrong: deceiving their patients and withhold-
ing…clinical data.”126  
While there have been several attempts to push for revisions to the mate-
rials, those provided today are still problematic. For example, in describing 
complications for vacuum aspiration, the documents currently provided 
state that “[a]ll complications may require Emergency Room treatment or 
surgery.” This is misleading because few complications actually require a 
visit to the emergency room, and if treatment is promptly started, full re-
covery is generally expected. 127 Furthermore, in describing the develop-
mental stages of a human embryo-fetus, the materials repeatedly call the 
pregnant woman “mother,” a loaded term given the context.128 Overall, the 
current materials overstate the risks of abortion, including the psychological 
consequences, understate the risks of childbirth, and use emotionally loaded 
language that lacks objectivity.129 A panel of experts in human anatomy 
working on the Informed Consent Project at Rutgers University reviewed 
the fetal development portion of Virginia’s ‘informed consent’ documents 
and found 22.29% of the statements to be inaccurate out of the total 157, 
with thirty-five medically inaccurate statements and 41% of statements 
about the first trimester inaccurate.130  
The combination of geography, economics, and the lack of insurance 
coverage with the already steep costs of the abortion procedures and associ-
ated costs of days off, child-care, travel, and ultrasounds ensure that the in-
formed consent and ultrasound provisions are not mere inconveniences. 
                                                
124 LLAMAS ET AL., supra note 47, at 10; see Heather Gould et al., Predictors of Abortion Counseling 
Receipt and Helpfulness in the United States, 23 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e249, e253 (2013). 
125 LLAMA ET AL., supra note 47, at 10. 
126 Id. at 11 (quoting Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted Consent: When 
Medical Ethics and Law Collide, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 21 (2009)). 
127 Compare VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION: MAKING AN INFORMED DECISION 5 (2018), 
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/content/uploads/sites/38/2016/11/InformedDecision.pdf, with COMM. ON 
REPROD. HEALTH SERVS., supra note 116, at 57–58.  
128 VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, FETAL DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE STAGES (2018), 
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/pregnancy/abortion-making-an-informed-decision/.  
129 See generally id.; VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 128. 
130 How Does Your State Compare? – Virginia, INFORMED CONSENT PROJECT, 
http://informedconsentproject.com/states/virginia/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2018); see also VA. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, supra note 129 (providing the materials evaluated by Informed Consent Project). 
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Justice Stephen Breyer, in urging the Court to look at undue burden empiri-
cally, forced the Court to consider these nuances and think about the actual 
experiences people have accessing abortion care.131 The Whole Woman’s 
Health Act would eliminate these needless impediments without sacrificing 
quality of care. Abortion patients should not be treated differently than oth-
er kinds of patients. There is no medically justifiable basis for it. Abortion 
patients want what all patients want: competent, compassionate care, an 
honest and respectful relationship with a provider they can trust, and the 
ability to make the right choice for them in consultation with their provider 
without jumping through superficial hoops.  
C. Act III – The TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) 
Virginia’s anti-choice state legislators took their biggest swing at abor-
tion providers during the 2011 General Assembly session with the passage 
of the “Licensing Statute.”132 Enacted as Virginia Code Section 32.1-
127(B)(1), the statute requires providers that perform five or more abortions 
per month to be subject to stringent licensing requirements and be regulated 
as “hospitals.”133  
As a result of the enactment of the Licensing Statute, the Virginia De-
partment of Health’s moved to “convene a medical committee to provide 
input on the regulatory drafting process.”134 As explained in the Falls 
Church v. Oliver Complaint, the committee was comprised of relevant ex-
perts, such as OB/GYN department chairs from major hospitals in Virginia, 
and it recommended that “onerous, unnecessary physical plant requirements 
contained in the regulations not apply to existing clinics, given that they 
were already providing high quality, safe care.”135 The Board of Health ini-
tially adopted regulations exempting existing clinics, but “in June 2011, At-
torney General Ken Cuccinelli – against medical opinion and expertise – 
                                                
131 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016). 
132 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 15. The TRAP was introduced as an amendment to an 
unrelated bill, SB 924. See Katharine Greenier & Rebecca Glenberg, Virginia’s Targeted Regulations of 
Abortion Providers: The Attempt to Regulate Abortion out of Existence, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1233, 
1239 (2014). 
133 VA. CODE § 32.1-127(B)(1) (2018). This TRAP law was a surprise amendment to a bill requiring the 
Board of Health to promulgate regulations defining the minimum standards for hospitals in Virginia, an 
amendment that saw no public debate and was rammed through the Senate on a 20-20 vote broken by, 
then, Lieutenant Governor Bill Bolling and signed into law by Governor Bob McDonnell. See Robin 
Marty, McDonnell Signs TRAP Bill, Unnecessarily Restricting Women’s Access to Reproductive Health 
Centers, REWIRE NEWS (Jan. 1, 2013) https://rewire.news/article/2013/01/01/virginia-governor-signs-
trap-bill-to-add-unnecessary-reglations-to-states-reprodu/.  
134 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 22. 
135 Id. 
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refused to certify the regulations with exemptions.”136 After significant 
pressure from the Attorney General’s office, including an ominous and 
threatening letter directed to the members of the Board, the Board of Health 
promulgated regulations without a waiver in September 2012 on a re-
vote.137 The regulations became effective in 2013.138 As a result of the high-
ly contentious and politicized process, Karen Remley, then Commissioner 
of Health, resigned from her position.139 She wrote to her colleagues ex-
plaining that her decision to resign was based upon the fact that "how spe-
cific sections of the Virginia Code pertaining to the development and en-
forcement of these regulations have been and continue to be interpreted has 
created an environment in which my ability to fulfill my duties is compro-
mised and in good faith I can no longer serve in my role."140 
As abortion providers began shutting their doors, a new administration 
took office in January 2014.141 Governor Terry McAuliffe ordered the 
Board of Health to take another look at the 2013 Licensing Regulations and 
solicit public comment.142 Again, the Board of Health heard from experts, 
providers, and the public. The healthcare community came out in force to 
make the argument that the regulations in place were completely inappro-
priate for facilities performing only first trimester abortions.143 In the mean-
time, while the contentious regulatory battle was brewing, the Supreme 
Court decided Whole Woman’s Health.144  
In order to comply with the decision, the Board of Health stripped re-
quirements from the regulations that mandated the “facilities comply with 
certain provisions of the Guidelines for Designs and Construction of Hospi-
tals and Outpatient Facilities issued by the Facilities Guide Institute.”145 
                                                
136 Id.  
137 See Jill Abbey et al., Comment Letter on Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facilities (Jul. 30, 
2014), https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/viewcomments.cfm?commentid=34586. 
138 See generally 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-412 (establishing regulations for licensure of abortion facili-
ties). 
139 Va. Health Chief Resigns Over New Abortion Clinic Rules, USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2012), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ondeadline/2012/10/18/virginia-health-commissioner-
resigns/1642197/. 
140 Id.  
141 See Trip Gabriel, Terry McAuliffe, Democrat, Is Elected Governor of Virginia in Tight Race, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/us/politics/mcauliffe-is-elected-governor-
in-virginia.html. 
142 See Va. Dep’t of Health, Notice of Intended Regulatory Action Agency Background Document: 
Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facilities, VA. REG. TOWN HALL (Nov. 3, 2014), 
https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/GetFile.cfm?File=58/4295/7120/AgencyStatement_VDH_7120_v1.pdf. 
143 See Jim Nolan, Va. Board of Health to Revisit Abortion Clinic Rules, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 
4, 2014), https://www.richmond.com/r-news/virginia/government-politics/va-board-of-health-to-revisit-
abortion-clinic-rules/article_cfd85899-6cfd-55f2-8fc9-67a7bc33ed5b.html. 
144 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
145 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 26–27. “As a result of that June 2016 decision, additional 
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While these changes were certainly a positive step in the right direction, 
they did not cure all of the flaws in the regulations. These flaws that re-
mained stemmed from the medically unnecessary and unduly burdensome 
requirement that the Board regulate facilities that perform five or more 
abortions as a type of hospital.146 Governor McAuliffe signed these new 
regulations, which became effective in May 2017. 147 
This history is instructive in demonstrating that even at the inception of 
the most recent batch of laws and regulations, opinions of medical experts 
were ignored, as laws and regulations were passed for the express purpose 
of limiting abortion. After all, Attorney General Cuccinelli openly admitted 
in an interview that his ultimate goal at the time was to “make abortion dis-
appear in America.”148  
The Virginia TRAP statute and subsequent regulations were not substi-
tutes for regulations already on abortion providers. These were in addition 
to the already-existing robust regulatory schemes that ensure that any of-
fice-based outpatient medical care is safe and effective.149 In Virginia, the 
Department of Health Professions’ (VDHP) authority, separate from that of 
the Virginia Department of Health, extends to the regulation of healthcare 
providers licensed by the boards within VDHP, including the Boards of 
Medicine, Nursing, and Pharmacy.150 This Department has its own inspec-
tion, investigative, and enforcement authority and can refer violators to the 
                                                                                                             
amendments to the regulations were deemed necessary by the Department based on advice from the Of-
fice of the Attorney General. The following additional amendments have been proposed: Onsite Inspec-
tions–striking certain requirements; Patient’s Rights–Striking specific reference to Joint Commission 
Standards; Infection Control–Striking specific reference to CDC Guidelines; Maintenance–Striking cer-
tain requirements already addressed by existing legal requirements; Firefighting Equipment and Sys-
tems–Striking requirements already addressed by existing legal requirements; Design and Construction–
Amended to specify that all construction of new buildings and additions, or major renovations to exist-
ing buildings for occupancy as an abortion facility shall conform to state and local codes and ordinances. 
At a special meeting of the Board of Health on October 24th, 2016, several additional amendments to 
the proposed language were submitted as motions by individual Board members and approved by the 
Board.” Va. Dep’t of Health, Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facilities, VA. REG. TOWN HALL 
(2017), https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/ViewAction.cfm?actionid=4295. It should be noted that this did 
not come without a controversy. There is an ongoing lawsuit in the Henrico County General District 
Court, filed by plaintiffs funded by the Family Foundation challenging this mid-process amendment to 
the regulations. Sean Gorman, Henrico Judge’s Ruling Allows Case Over State Abortion Regulations to 
Proceed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.richmond.com/news/local/henrico/henrico-judge-s-ruling-allows-case-over-state-abortion-
regulations/article_b216ab8e-8708-54f9-a519-13726a2c5e9e.html.   
146 See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-412-100 (2018); see also id. § 5-412-10 (defining “abortion facility”). 
147 Key Dates of Terry McAuliffe’s Tenure as Governor of Virginia, Rich. Times-Dispatch (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly/key-dates-of-
terry-mcauliffe-s-tenure-as-governor-of/article_b7f6f891-39e2-5563-8e73-257ad897cea2.html. 
148 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 12 (citing Interview by Peter Shinn with Ken Cuccinelli, 
Va. Att’y Gen. (May 9, 2012)). 
149 See id. at 26–27. 
150 Id. at 28. 
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Office of the Attorney General for criminal prosecution when necessary and 
impose monetary penalties.151 Virginia’s Board of Medicine also has en-
forcement and licensing authority over physicians and clinicians in the 
Commonwealth.152 The regulations promulgated by the Board of Medicine 
further outline standards of practice, covering a plethora of issues ranging 
from informed consent to discharge policies to administration of anesthesia 
in office-based settings.153 The new licensure requirements under the TRAP 
statute apply in addition to all the already-existing regulations, arbitrarily 
adding a medically unnecessary layer of regulation and paperwork.154 Still, 
these requirements only apply to facilities performing five or more abor-
tions per month and do not regulate offices where other, riskier procedures 
take place.155  
Abortions are incredibly safe, but the TRAP regulations contain detailed 
requirements for clinical protocols, including equipment and supplies, med-
ications, and anesthesia, even more detailed than some of those for required 
for inpatient hospitals.156 Studies confirm that abortion safety does not vary 
based on the type of facility where the abortion is performed, whether an 
office setting or a full ambulatory surgical center.157 Thus, the TRAP statute 
and subsequent regulations at their very core are “not based on scientific ev-
idence and don’t protect patient safety.”158 
The worst of the TRAP building requirements were removed from Vir-
ginia’s regulations in 2016.159 However, what remain are extensive adminis-
trative requirements, inappropriate for small medical offices with limited 
staff and few resources.160 These include bloated formalities like a “quality 
improvement committee” responsible for oversight and supervision of the 
required “ongoing, comprehensive, integrated, self-assessment program of 
the quality and appropriateness of care or services provided.”161 In addition 
to the administrative burdens, the licensing requirements involve routine, 
warrantless, unannounced, and invasive inspections.162 
                                                
151 See VA. CODE §§ 54.1-2505(8)–(10), 54.1-2505(15), 54.1-2505(21) (2018). 
152 See id. § 54.1-2915(A). 
153 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 340, 350, 380 (2018). 
154 See id. § 85-20 et seq. (2018).  
155 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 29. 
156 See generally 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-412 (explaining the significant TRAP requirements for abor-
tion facilities). 
157 ANSRH, supra note 98. 
158 Id. 
159 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 24–25. 
160 Id. at 28. 
161 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-412-210 (2018). 
162 Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 30. 
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There have been no detailed studies of the effect of Virginia’s TRAP 
statute on patient outcomes or experiences, but research from other states 
throughout the country indicates that TRAP laws can have a deleterious ef-
fect on patient outcomes by increasing wait-times and costs and reducing 
overall access.163 Since the TRAP regulations were enacted, abortion clinics 
have had to devote an increasing amount of time and staff resources to 
complying with the regulations, time and resources that would otherwise be 
devoted to patient care.164  
The impact of the TRAP regulations is born out in the fact that in 2008, 
85% of Virginia counties had no abortion provider and 54% of women in 
Virginia lived in those counties. By 2014, after the TRAP regulations were 
enacted, these numbers had gone up to 92% and 78% respectively, effec-
tively denying Virginian women the right to accessible and affordable abor-
tion services.165 
III.  UNDUE BURDEN TEST POST-WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 
Roe was a flawed decision, one that was subsequently weakened further 
by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Gonzales v. Car-
hart,166 and others.167 In case after case, the Court seemed to put a premium 
on a state’s explicit objectives when passing regulations and took little 
stock of actual circumstances many pregnant people face when they attempt 
to access their fundamental right.168 Whole Woman’s Health appeared to be 
a watershed moment that could change the tide and open the doors to chal-
lenge the hundreds of abortion restrictions passed throughout the country 
over the last few years.169  
                                                
163 Nichole Austin & Sam Harper, Assessing the Impact of TRAP Laws on Abortion and Women’s 
Health in the USA: A Systematic Review, 44 BMJ SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 128, 130, 132 (2018).  
164 E.g., Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 40. 
165 State Facts About Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120920001329/http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/virginia.html; State 
Facts About Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts-
about-abortion-virginia. 
166 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163–64 (2007). 
167 See Emily Crockett, How the Supreme Court Weakened Roe v. Wade and Set the Stage for A New 
Abortion Case, VOX (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/22/10815708/roe-v-wade-supreme-
court-weakened-abortion   (stating that Roe v. Wade was subsequently weakened by Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood and Gonzales v. Carhart). 
168 E.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163–64 (stating that in cases of medical uncertainty, states have “wide 
discretion” to pass legislation). 
169 See Ted Booker, Whole Women’s Health Alliance Files Lawsuit Challenging Indiana Abortion Re-
strictions, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (June 22, 2018), https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/local/whole-
woman-s-health-alliance-files-lawsuit-challenging-indiana-abortion/article_12e6063c-c547-5516-9fe1-
b12f82a5fcf1.html (stating that Whole Women’s Health Alliance was able to challenge abortion re-
strictions in other states following Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt). 
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Perhaps the most important take-away from Whole Woman’s Health, 
aside from the re-affirmation that abortion is a constitutionally protected 
right, was the majority’s deference to empiricism.170 The Court did not just 
accept Texas’ stated health and safety reasons for the restrictions, but in-
stead assessed the underlying basis for the professed health benefits and the 
actual effects on access.171 The Court rejected the notion that courts are not 
“competent” to review the benefits and burdens abortion restrictions impose 
when the restriction “purportedly was enacted to promote an interest in po-
tential life.”172 Instead, the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he statement that legis-
latures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty is also 
inconsistent with this Court’s case law,” and that Gonzales really meant that 
“court[s] retain [] an independent constitutional duty to review factual find-
ings where constitutional rights are at stake.”173 
When substantial burdens are imposed on pregnant people accessing 
their constitutionally guaranteed rights with no compelling evidence of ben-
efits, as was the case in Texas, the law must be struck down as unconstitu-
tional.174 In Virginia, the overall legal scheme that would be struck down by 
the Whole Woman’s Health Act is exactly of this ilk. There are no real 
health benefits to any portion of the TRAP statute and regulations, the abor-
tion criminalization statutes, or the informed consent statutes. Despite the 
regulatory changes made in 2016, the current regulations remain an imped-
iment to the opening of new facilities and create undue burdens for patients 
as they try to access abortion care.  
IV.  THE POST-WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH WORLD - SO WHAT ABOUT 
CASEY? 
Whole Woman’s Health did not overturn the confusing and problematic 
history of Supreme Court decisions on abortion by presenting a new test.175 
Casey and Gonzales were not reversed by this decision, and the damage to 
abortion access already done was not completely undone with one stroke. 
The Court did flesh out the undue burden balancing tests, placing it on more 
                                                
170 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–11 (2016). 
171 See id. at 2310–13. 
172 Leah M. Litman, Unduly Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts are Undermining Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 116 MICH. L. REV. 50, 57 (2017) (citing Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2309). 
173 Id. at 55–57 (citing Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10). 
174 See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. 
175 See id. at 2309–10 (using the undue burden standard to find a Texas law’s admitting-privileges and 
surgical-center requirements for its abortion clinics unconstitutional). 
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solid ground and thereby giving some room to re-examine statutes previ-
ously deemed constitutional.176 
Given the retirement of Justice Kennedy and the fact that the Trump ad-
ministration will, in all likelihood, be able to appoint a justice to the Su-
preme Court, the future of Whole Woman’s Health is uncertain.177  Howev-
er, even if the decision is untouched, there remain questions about its 
effects on statutes that are not directly analogous to those found unconstitu-
tional in Texas. It is unclear how Whole Women’s Health would impact the 
24-hour waiting period, mandatory ultrasound, non-structural TRAP regula-
tions, criminalization of abortion, and the other laws and regulations the 
Whole Woman’s Health Act would strike from the Virginia Code.178 
While Casey has not been overturned, and in fact has been reaffirmed in 
dicta by the majority in NIFLA v. Becerra on First Amendment grounds, the 
fact-based inquiry the Supreme Court requires in Whole Woman’s Health 
should extend to the regulations and laws previously upheld by the Court.179 
The regulations ought not be judged as constitutional or not based solely on 
their content, but rather, they should be judged on their impact – a fact-
specific inquiry to be undertaken in each individual case.  
After Roe, Casey was the next watershed decision in abortion politics. In 
it, the Supreme Court abandoned strict scrutiny as the standard of review on 
abortion rights and instead adopted the undue burden standard.180 While the 
undue burden standard is simple to state, a state’s regulation of abortion is 
constitutional so long as it does not pose an “undue burden” on the pregnant 
person seeking an abortion, it has remained difficult to apply.181 The undue 
burden test is a unique standard of review applicable only to abortion.182 By 
adopting it, the Court rejected Roe’s support of a woman’s interest in her 
own body and the devaluation of states’ interest that occurred in Roe.183 
Therefore, “the undue burden standard provided ‘the appropriate means of 
reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected 
                                                
176 See id. at 2310–16. 
177 See Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy, the Pivotal Swing Vote on the Supreme Court, Announces His 
Retirement, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-
kennedy-the-pivotal-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announces-retirement/2018/06/27/a40a8c64-
5932-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html?utm_term=.485d9efeda6d. 
178 See H.B. 1231, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 
136 S. Ct. 2292 (holding that the Texas law regulating access to abortion violated the constitution). 
179 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018); Whole Wom-
an’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–15. 
180 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 877 (1992). 
181 See Donaldson, supra note 57, at 280, 282. 
182 See id. at 280. 
183 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, 873. 
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liberty.’”184 The deference shown by the Court to the legislature in Casey 
emboldened anti-abortion advocates and other states’ legislatures and 
opened the doors for numerous restrictions across the country, leading to 
the closure of hundreds of clinics.185  
Using Casey’s undue burden tests as the cornerstone of subsequent deci-
sions, the Court upheld the “partial birth abortion” ban in Gonzales.186 In its 
decision, the Court relinquished its duty as fact-finder and bowed with sig-
nificant deference to Congressional findings, including Congress’ reliance 
on pseudoscience.187 The Court reached its conclusions despite evidence 
from medical professionals concerning the efficacy and safety of the proce-
dure and the need for a health and safety exceptions to the ban.188 As a re-
sult, while some states like California made abortion easier and more acces-
sible, in other parts of the country abortion deserts formed, with clinic 
numbers cratering and access becoming all but impossible for many.189  
Then came Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. While it did not over-
turn Casey or Gonzales directly, it did open a door to challenge analogous 
statutes and regulations in the future. 190  Post-Whole Woman’s Health, mul-
tiple lawsuits have been filed across the country challenging existing abor-
tion restrictions, including the Falls Church v. Oliver litigation.191 Each 
challenge is rooted in a fact-specific inquiry, leaning heavily on the position 
that fact-based evidence, not ideology, should rule the day when it comes to 
determining what is and is not an undue burden.192 The plaintiffs in these 
cases argue that courts should take into account the full impact of abortion 
restrictions imposed on pregnant people, and not just those explicitly 
acknowledged by the legislatures.193  
                                                
184 Wolk & Snead, supra note 10, at 724 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 876). 
185 See id. at 722–24 (2018) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833).  
186 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 132–33 (2007). 
187 Caroline Reilly, More than a Minor Burden: A Post-Whole Women’s Health Analysis of Parental 
Involvement Laws 35 (May 10, 2017) (unpublished student paper), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2960375. 
188 Donaldson, supra note 57, at 285 (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147). 
189 Lisa M. Kelly, Abortion Travel and the Limits of Choice, 12 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV. 27, 39–40 (2016). 
190 See Ziegler, supra note 45, at 352 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt could be reconciled with the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart).  
191 See, e.g., Falls Church Med. Ctr. v. Oliver, No. 3:18-cv-428 (E.D. Va. filed June 20, 2018). 
192 See Donaldson, supra note 57, at 285–86 (discussing Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (regarding the legitimacy of factual findings based on evidence of pseudoscience)). 
193 See, e.g. Complaint at 1, 14, Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, No. 1:18-cv-1904 (S.D. Ind. 2018) 
(challenging the extensive burdens of Indiana’s TRAP statutes; the restrictions on the use of Mifepris-
tone; the mandatory disclosure and waiting period laws; the parental involvement laws; and the crimi-
nalization of abortion). 
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Whole Woman’s Health rested on medical evidence, or rather the lack of 
medical evidence, to support the stated interest in imposing a burden to pro-
tect health.194 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, stated that the courts, 
in reviewing regulations under the undue burden standard had an obligation 
to examine “the existence or nonexistence of medical benefits” and to look 
at the actual effects of regulatory changes on the experience of pregnant 
people.195 However, in NIFLA v. Becerra the Court, in the course of ruling 
California’s attempts to impose regulations on crisis pregnancy center 
communications with their patients unconstitutional, reaffirmed the Casey 
ruling concerning informed consent requirements on free speech grounds.196 
In the Court’s opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas characterized Pennsylva-
nia’s informed consent statute as simply “a law requiring physicians to ob-
tain informed consent before they could perform an abortion.”197 The Court 
further stated that Casey rejected the free-speech challenge because the in-
formed consent requirement “for constitutional purposes, [was] no different 
from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any 
medical procedure.”198 The Whole Woman’s Health Act would remove sim-
ilar informed consent statutes from Virginia law, and the Falls Church v. 
Oliver lawsuit challenges the validity of such statutes based on the undue 
burden standard found in Whole Woman’s Health, not on free speech 
grounds.199 While in the abstract requiring medical professionals to obtain 
informed consent would not be viewed as an unconstitutional infringement 
on a medical professional’s free speech, if anything can be carried away 
from Whole Woman’s Health, it is that the actual requirements and their ef-
fects have to be viewed empirically, and not in the abstract, when determin-
ing whether they impose an undue burden on access to abortion.200   
CONCLUSION  
The history of abortion laws and regulations in Virginia is rooted in anti-
abortion animus, rather than genuine concern for the health and safety of 
the patients. Arising from these beginnings, it is no surprise that many of 
Virginia’s abortion statutes and associated regulations remain on the books 
                                                
194 See Donaldson, supra note 57, at 288. 
195 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016); Donaldson, supra note 57, 
at 290. 
196 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018). 
197 Id. at 2373 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)). 
198 Id.  
199 See Falls Church Complaint, supra note 9, at 55. 
200 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10; see Cathren Cohen, Beyond Rational Belief: Evaluat-
ing Health-Justified Abortion Restrictions after Whole Woman’s Health, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 173, 190–91 (2018). 
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and create unnecessary burdens for pregnant Virginians seeking abortion 
access. The Whole Woman’s Health Act, a comprehensive bill that would 
excise the most pernicious of the baseless abortion statutes from the Virgin-
ia Code, has failed to make it through the General Assembly for two years 
in a row, with only limited consideration. Adopting the Whole Woman’s 
Health Act would reflect the underlying principle in the Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt decision and the clarified ‘undue burden’ standard, 
removing medically unnecessary impediments to abortion access. While the 
recent developments regarding the composition of the Supreme Court and 
more recent Supreme Court decisions may make it seem less urgent, the 
need for this law remains critical.  
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